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这篇文章节选自 Economic Review 2nd Quarter 1997..简单来说,就是当rrr=0的时候reserve就不取决于rrr,而是设定为一个常量,同时multiplier equation就失效了,因为这样根本就不存在一个multiplier,等式两边都是一个常量....但是之前去问火鸡,他说不对.不知道他是故意这样说还是文章真的错了.
In New Zealand, the focal point of monetary policy operations is the amount of settlement balances or “settlement cash” held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Huxford and Reddell).
Most banks choose to hold balances at the Reserve Bank in order to clear directly transactions with the government and the Reserve Bank and to settle interbank transactions. If a bank has a settlement account, the Reserve Bank requires that this account have a nonnegative balance at the end of the day. This daily balance requirement, similar to that in the UK, gives the central bank leverage over short-term interest rates. By controlling both the supply of settlement balances relative to the demand and the opportunity cost of holding these balances, the Reserve Bank can influence short-term rates.
To implement policy, the Reserve Bank uses open market operations to achieve a target level of settlement cash balances. This target is set so that errors in forecasting settlement balances will lead the banking system occasionally to face a prospective shortage. In this situation, the Reserve Bank is the only source of additional balances. To obtain these balances, however, banks must sell a special asset called “Reserve Bank bills” to the Reserve Bank and pay a penalty rate for these funds. The combination of a limited supply of Reserve Bank bills and the penalty rate on additional settlement balances causes banks to attempt to fund settlement balance deficiencies in the money market, transmitting settlement balance pressures to market interest rates. At the same time, the Reserve Bank pays interest on positive settlement balances held at the end of the day. However, this rate is set sufficiently below market rates that banks have an incentive to dispose of excess balances in the money market, rather than relying on the Reserve Bank’s payment of interest.
In this framework, when the Reserve Bank feels that a change in monetary policy is warranted, it can alter the settlement cash target or issue public statements of its intentions. Thus, for example, a lowering of the settlement cash target will increase the likelihood that banks will face a settlement balance deficiency, placing upward pressure on market rates. Similarly, an increase in the cash target will place downward pressure on rates. In recent years, the Reserve
Bank has also placed increased emphasis on public statements to convey its policy intent.
These statements plus the publication of the Reserve Bank’s own inflation projections and desired conditions for short-term interest rates and exchange rates convey changes in the stance of monetary policy to financial markets.
As in Canada and the UK, ongoing institutional changes in the New Zealand payments system have implications for monetary policy operating procedures. In addition, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has recently undertaken a comprehensive review of is procedures for implementing monetary policy. If proposed changes are adopted, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand will move away from implementing policy through a settlement cash target in favor of an explicit operating band for interest rates.
One important institutional change in New Zealand is the introduction of a real time gross settlement (RTGS) system for the large-dollar payments system. As in the UK, adoption of RTGS in a system without reserve requirements will increase intraday liquidity pressures. Like the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand plans to respond by introducing an intraday repurchase facility so that banks can obtain additional funds in their settlement accounts as needed during the day. This change is expected to prevent intraday liquidity pressures from affecting the volatility of overnight and other short-term rates.
More fundamental changes in monetary policy operating procedures may also be forthcoming. The Reserve Bank has recently proposed replacing much of the institutional framework used to target settlement cash balances with a framework relying on an explicit target range for the overnight cash rate. This proposed system has many similarities to the new framework to be used by the Bank of Canada. The main feature of this new system would be a target range of 20 to 50 basis points for the overnight rate. The upper end of this range is the rate at which the Reserve Bank would provide additional settlement balances through repurchase agreements. The lower end of the range would be the rate paid by the Reserve Bank on settlement balances. Monetary policy would operate, not by targeting the amount of settlement cash balances, but by changing the cash rate range to influence other short-term interest rates and exchange rates. The Reserve Bank believes that these changes are likely to increase its leverage over short-term interest rates and the efficiency and transparency of monetary policy operations. The Bank also feels that this new framework provides administrative convenience in operating with a real time settlement system. |
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发表于 2005-10-18 22:45:58
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